


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18 April 1964

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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South Vietnam: [The Viet Cong reportedly have ordered their cadres to emphasize certain tactics, probably to exploit specific weaknesses of the Khanh regime.]

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[a combination of political activity and constant military attacks to weaken government forces is designed to support the movement for the neutralization of South Vietnam.]

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[In the countryside, the Viet Cong are said to have been ordered to launch a campaign "on all fronts" to hamper large-scale government operations, to harass the "New Rural Life" (formerly "strategic") hamlets, to expand Viet Cong "combat hamlets," and to build up Viet Cong village administration.]

[In the towns, the Viet Cong are to "guide" the activities of student, religious, and political groups, and to offer material support to advocates of a coup.]

[These orders indicate no sharp departure from past Viet Cong activities. They suggest, however, that the Viet Cong view the Khanh regime as unstable and that in the present situation Communists can press their own campaign more vigorously. Recent intensification of Viet Cong military activity and increased propaganda against Khanh himself may also reflect such a judgment.]

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*Libya: King Idris reportedly has ordered Premier Muntassir to agree to allow Western bases to remain in Libya for a prolonged period of time.]

[Although a Libyan parliamentary resolution leaves the date of evacuation of the bases as the only question open to negotiation, the King assured Muntassir that parliament would accept an agreement allowing US and British bases to remain considerably longer than three or four years.]

[The King indicated that a new, more "reliable" parliament would be elected later this year, and that certain tribal chiefs would be replaced to insure greater tribal loyalty.]

[These views reflect Idris' increased confidence since the public displays of loyalty to him last month when he threatened to abdicate. This threat, together with firmer government efforts to control the press, has considerably lowered the temperature generated by the bases issue. The King's maneuvers also appear to have played some part in Cairo's easing its propaganda on the question.]

[However successful the King has been so far, he is probably overoptimistic in expecting that the trend against the bases can be permanently reversed. His aloofness from the day-to-day business of government may have led him to underestimate nationalist sentiment, particularly in the populous Tripolitanian region where attachment to the monarchy has never been strong.]

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Britain-Cuba: [The UK continues to hold a position strongly at odds with the US on the question of applying economic pressure against Cuba.]

[At the mid-April meeting of the North Atlantic Council, permanent UK representative Shuckburgh, read a prepared statement declaring that London was opposed "in principle" to economic warfare in peacetime. Britain does not agree that its trade policies should differentiate among Communist countries and recognizes that this is a "fundamental difference" between the UK and the US.]

[Shuckburgh strongly denied that Cuba is a poor credit risk. He also questioned the thesis that to help Cuba economically serves to strengthen Havana's capacity for subversion elsewhere in the hemisphere. In Britain's view, he said, a Cuba dependent on the bloc is a far greater danger to the West.]

[Shuckburgh said his statement had been "reviewed at the highest level in London," and he claimed it was doubtful that the British position could be changed as a result of arguments used in the council.]

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NOTES

South Korea: [Student demonstrations resumed yesterday on a small scale and probably will grow in size and intensity over this weekend, the anniversary of the 1960 student uprising against the Rhee regime. The demonstrators intend to protest against government corruption, particularly the activities of Kim Chong-pil, President Pak's right-hand man, and against police interference in student affairs. The security forces controlled demonstrations last month with a minimum of force, but there is a continuing danger that violence may develop.]

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Brazil-Cuba: Brazilian Foreign Minister Leitao da Cunha [asked President Castello Branco to break relations with Havana immediately. Castello Branco asked for time to reflect, but [Leitao da Cunha expects a favorable decision. The foreign minister is said to have obtained a commitment from the Swiss to look after Brazilian affairs in Cuba should there be a diplomatic break.]

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Argentina: [Gendarmes turned up another small cache of arms and ammunition in a small town on the Bolivian border last week as they continued to investigate guerrilla activity in northwestern Argentina. Five persons were arrested, including three Argentine customs employees suspected of implication in the arms smuggling. The Argentines assume that the arms were intended for operations in Salta Province, where police captured several guerrillas and discovered small arms caches last month.]

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Canada - Communist China: [Canada's negotiations with Peiping for an exchange of resident correspondents are moving slowly, according to a Canadian official in Hong Kong. He attributes this to Chinese insistence that the New China News Agency office to be established in Ottawa also be allowed to distribute "information." In the meantime, the Canadians intend to approach the Japanese--who have similar interests--with a view to coordinating their positions.]

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